On the `Semantics' of Differential Privacy: A Bayesian Formulation by Kasiviswanathan, Shiva Prasad & Smith, Adam
ar
X
iv
:0
80
3.
39
46
v3
  [
cs
.C
R]
  2
2 D
ec
 20
15
On the ‘Semantics’ of Differential Privacy:
A Bayesian Formulation∗
Shiva Prasad Kasiviswanathan†
General Electric Global Research
kasivisw@gmail.com
Adam Smith‡
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
The Pennsylvania State University
asmith@psu.edu
Abstract
Differential privacy is a definition of “privacy” for algorithms that analyze and publish information
about statistical databases. It is often claimed that differential privacy provides guarantees against adver-
saries with arbitrary side information. In this paper, we provide a precise formulation of these guarantees
in terms of the inferences drawn by a Bayesian adversary. We show that this formulation is satisfied by
both ǫ-differential privacy as well as a relaxation, (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. Our formulation follows the
ideas originally due to Dwork and McSherry, stated implicitly in [5]. This paper is, to our knowledge,
the first place such a formulation appears explicitly. The analysis of the relaxed definition is new to this
paper, and provides guidance for setting the δ parameter when using (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
1 Introduction
Privacy is an increasingly important aspect of data publishing. Reasoning about privacy, however, is fraught
with pitfalls. One of the most significant is the auxiliary information (also called external knowledge,
background knowledge, or side information) that an adversary gleans from other channels such as the web,
public records, or domain knowledge. Schemes that retain privacy guarantees in the presence of independent
releases are said to compose securely. The terminology, borrowed from cryptography (which borrowed, in
turn, from software engineering), stems from the fact that schemes that compose securely can be designed in
a stand-alone fashion without explicitly taking other releases into account. Thus, understanding independent
releases is essential for enabling modular design. In fact, one would like schemes that compose securely not
only with independent instances of themselves, but with arbitrary external knowledge.
Certain randomization-based notions of privacy (such as differential privacy, due to Dwork, McSherry,
Nissim, and Smith [10]) are viewed as providing meaningful guarantees even in the presence of arbitrary
side information. In this paper. we give a precise formulation of this statement. First, we provide a Bayesian
formulation of “pure” differential privacy which explicitly models side information. Second, we prove that
the relaxed definitions of Blum et al. [2], Dwork et al. [9] and Machanavajjhala et al. [16] imply the Bayesian
formulation. The proof is non-trivial, and relies on the “continuity” of Bayes’ rule with respect to certain
∗Preliminary statements of the main results from this paper appeared in Ganta et al. [11]. This paper contains strengthened
results as well as full proofs.
†S.K.’s work at Penn State was partly supported by NSF award TF-0729171.
‡A.S. is supported by NSF awards TF-0729171, CDI-0941553, PECASE CCF-0747294 and a Google Faculty Award.
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distance measures on probability distributions. Our result means that techniques satisfying the relaxed defi-
nitions can be used with the same sort of assurances as in the case of pure differentially-private algorithms,
as long parameters are set appropriately. Specifically, (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy provides meaningful guar-
antees whenever δ, the additive error parameter, is smaller than about ǫ2/n, where n is the size of the data
set.
Organization. After introducing the basic definitions, we state and discuss our main results in Section 2.
In Section 2.1, we relate our approach to other efforts—subsequent to the initial version of this work—that
sought to pin down mathematical precise formulations of the “meaning” of differential privacy. Section 3
proves our main theorems. Along the way, we develop lemmas about (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishability—the notion
of similarity that underlies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy—-that we believe are of independent interest. The most
useful of these, which we dub the Conditioning Lemma, is given in Section 3.3. Finally, we provide further
discussion of our approach in Section 4.
1.1 Differential Privacy
Databases are assumed to be vectors in Dn for some domain D. The Hamming distance dH(x, y) on Dn
is the number of positions in which the vectors x, y differ. We let Pr[·] and E[·] denote probability and
expectation, respectively. Given a randomized algorithm A, we let A(x) be the random variable (or, proba-
bility distribution on outputs) corresponding to input x. If X and Y are probability distributions (or random
variables) on a discrete space D, the statistical difference (a.k.a. total variation distance) between X and Y
is defined as:
SD (X,Y ) = max
S⊂D
|Pr[X ∈ S]− Pr[Y ∈ S]| .
Definition 1.1 (ǫ-differential privacy [10]). A randomized algorithm A is said to be ǫ-differentially private
if for all databases x, y ∈ Dn at Hamming distance at most 1, and for all subsets S of outputs,
Pr[A(x) ∈ S] ≤ eǫ · Pr[A(y) ∈ S].
This definition states that changing a single individual’s data in the database leads to a small change
in the distribution on outputs. Unlike more standard measures of distance such as statistical difference or
Kullback-Leibler divergence, the metric here is multiplicative and so even very unlikely events must have
approximately the same probability under the distributions A(x) and A(y). This condition was relaxed
somewhat in other papers [4, 8, 2, 9, 3, 17, 16]. The schemes in all those papers, however, satisfy the
following relaxation (first formulated by Dwork, Kenthapadi, McSherry, Mironov, and Naor [9]):
Definition 1.2 ((ǫ, δ)-differential privacy [9]). A randomized algorithm A is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if
for all databases x, y ∈ Dn that differ in one entry, and for all subsets S of outputs,
Pr[A(x) ∈ S] ≤ eǫ · Pr[A(y) ∈ S] + δ .
2 Semantics of Differential Privacy
There is a crisp, semantically-flavored1 interpretation of differential privacy, due to Dwork and McSherry,
explained in [5]: Regardless of external knowledge, an adversary with access to the sanitized database
1The use of the term “semantic” for definitions that deal directly with adversarial knowledge dates back to semantic security of
encryption [12].
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draws the same conclusions whether or not my data is included in the original database. One might hope
for a stronger statement, namely that the adversary draws the same conclusions whether or not the data is
used at all. However, such a strong statement is impossible to provide in the presence of arbitrary external
information (Dwork and Naor [6], Dwork [5]; see also Kifer and Machanavajjhala [14]), as illustrated by
the following example.
Example 1. Consider a clinical study that explores the relationship between smoking and lung disease. A
health insurance company who had no a priori understanding of that relationship might dramatically alter
its “beliefs” (as encoded by insurance premiums) to account for the results of the study. The study would
cause the company to raise premiums for smokers and lower them for nonsmokers, regardless of whether
they participated in the study. In this case, the conclusions drawn by the company about the riskiness of any
one individual (say Alice) are strongly affected by the results of the study. This occurs regardless of whether
Alice’s data are included in the study. ♦
In this section, we develop a formalization Dwork and McSherry’s interpretation and explore its relation
to standard definitions. To proceed, we require a mathematical formulation of “external knowledge”, and of
“drawing conclusions”. The first is captured via a prior probability distribution b on Dn (b is a mnemonic
for “beliefs”). Conclusions are modeled by the corresponding posterior distribution: given a transcript t, the
adversary updates his belief b about the database x using Bayes’ rule to obtain a posterior b¯:
b¯[x|t] = Pr[A(x) = t]b[x]∑
z Pr[A(z) = t]b[z]
. (1)
When the mechanism A is interactive, the definition of A depends on the adversary’s choices; for
legibility we omit the dependence on the adversary in the notation. Also, for simplicity, we discuss only
discrete probability distributions. Our results extend directly to the interactive, continuous case.
For a database x, define x−i to be the same vector except position i has been replaced by some fixed,
default valueD. Any valid value inD will do for the default value. We define n+1 related games, numbered
0 through n. In Game 0, the adversary interacts with A(x). This is the interaction that actually takes place
between the adversary and the randomized algorithm A. The distribution b¯0 is just the distribution b¯ as
defined in (1).
In Game i (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n), the adversary interacts with A(x−i). Game i describes the hypothetical
scenario where person i’s data is not used.2 In Game i > 0, given a transcript t, the adversary updates his
belief b about database x again using Bayes’ rule to obtain a posterior b¯i as follows:
b¯i[x|t] = Pr[A(x−i) = t]b[x]∑
z Pr[A(z−i) = t]b[z]
. (2)
Through these n + 1 games, we get n + 1 a posteriori distributions b¯0, . . . , b¯n, where b¯0 is same as
b¯ (defined in (1)), and b¯i (i > 0) is the posterior distribution obtained when the adversary interacts with
A(x−i) and uses this interaction to update his belief distribution (defined in (2)).
Given a particular transcript t, we say privacy has been breached if the adversary would draw different
conclusions about the world and, in particular, about a person i, depending on whether or not i’s data was
used. One could formally define “different” in many ways. In this paper, we choose a weak (but popular)
2It could happen by coincidence that person i’s data equals the default value and hence that x = x−i. This doesn’t affect the
meaning of the result since the default value is chosen independently of the data. Readers bothered by the possible coincidence
may choose to think of the default value as a special value ⊥ (e.g., “no data”) that does not correspond to any real record.
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measure of distance between probability distributions, namely statistical difference. We say the adversary
has learned something, if for any transcript t the distributions b¯0[·|t] and b¯i[·|t] are far apart in statistical
difference. We would like to avoid this from happening for any potential participant. This is captured by the
following definition.
Definition 2.1 (ǫ-semantic privacy). A randomized algorithm A is said to be ǫ-semantically private if for
all belief distributions b on Dn, for all possible transcripts t, and for all i = 1, . . . , n:
SD
(
b¯0[·|t] , b¯i[·|t]
) ≤ ǫ.
Our formulation of semantic privacy is inspired by Dwork and McSherry’s interpretation of differential
privacy [5]. We now formally show that the notions of ǫ-differential privacy (Definition 1.1) and ǫ-semantic
privacy (Definition 2.1) are essentially equivalent.
Theorem 2.2. For all ǫ > 0, ǫ-differential privacy implies ǫ¯-semantic privacy, where ǫ¯ = eǫ − 1. For
0 < ǫ ≤ 0.45, ǫ/2-semantic privacy implies 3ǫ-differential privacy.
The proof of this and all other results in this section may be found in Section 3.
We can extend the previous Bayesian formulation to capture situations where bad events can occur with
some negligible probability. Specifically, we formulate (ǫ, δ)-semantic privacy and show that it is closely
related to (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
Definition 2.3 ((ǫ, δ)-semantic privacy). A randomized algorithm is (ǫ, δ)-semantically private if for all
belief distributions b on Dn, with probability at least 1 − δ over t ∼ A(x) (t drawn from A(x)), where the
database x is drawn according to b, and for all i = 1, . . . , n:
SD
(
b¯0[·|t] , b¯i[·|t]
) ≤ ǫ.
The (ǫ, δ)-privacy definition is most interesting when ǫ≫ δ, since every (ǫ, δ)-private algorithm is also
(0, δ+(eǫ− 1))-differentially private. Below, we assume ǫ > δ. In fact, many of our results are meaningful
only when δ is less than 1/n, while ǫ must generally be much larger than 1/n to allow for useful algorithms.
Theorem 2.4 (Main Theorem).
(1) If ǫ, δ > 0 and δ < (1 − e−ǫ)2/n, then (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy implies (ǫ′, δ′)-semantic privacy on
databases of size n with ǫ′ = e3ǫ − 1 + 2√nδ and δ′ = 4√nδ.
(2) If ǫ, δ > 0 and ǫ ≤ 0.45, then (ǫ, δ)-semantic privacy implies (3ǫ, 2δ)-differential privacy.
In Appendix B, we discuss a stronger notion of (ǫ, δ)-semantic privacy and show that (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy need not imply this stronger semantic privacy guarantee.
Remark 1. The implications in Theorems 2.2 and 2.4 would not hold if differential privacy were defined
in terms of statistical difference (total variation distance) or mutual information instead of the multiplicative
metric used in Definitions 1.1 and 1.2. For example, one could change the last line of the Definition 1.2 to
Pr[A(x) ∈ S] ≤ Pr[A(y) ∈ S] + ǫSD . (3)
For this modified definition to allow publishing useful information, one would need ǫSD = Ω(1/n) (other-
wise, data sets that differ in all n elements would still be hard to distinguish). However, in that parameter
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range there is a mechanism that satisfies the new definition but does not satisfy “semantic” privacy for any
reasonable parameters. Namely, consider the mechanism which on input x = (x1, . . . , xn) samples a uni-
formly random index i ∈ {1, ..., n} and outputs (i, xi). This mechanism is intuitively unsatisfactory, since
it always outputs some individual’s data in the clear. It also does not satisfy semantic privacy for any pair
(ǫ, δ) where ǫ < 1 and δ < 1. Nevertheless, it does satisfy the requirement of (3) with ǫSD = 1/n. The
same mechanism also satisfies the natural variant of differential privacy based on mutual information (for
example, where the mutual information between A(x) and xi is required to be small for all indices i and
product distributions on x). ♦
2.1 Related Approaches
Prior to Posterior Comparisons. In the original paper on differential privacy, Dwork et al. [10] defined a
notion of “semantic” privacy that involved comparing the prior and posterior distributions of the adversary.
In the language of the preceding section, they require that SD
(
b[·] , b¯i[·|t]
) ≤ ǫ for a subclass of belief
distributions, called “informed beliefs”, in which all but one of the data set entries are fixed (constant).
They show that this definition is equivalent to differential privacy. Kifer and Machanavajjhala [15] use this
prior-to-posterior approach to generalize differential privacy to other settings.
However, the impossibility results of Dwork and Naor [5, 7] and Kifer and Machanavajjhala [14], exem-
plified by the smoking example in Example 1, imply that no mechanism that provides nontrivial information
about the data set satisfies such a prior-to-posterior definition for all distributions.
This impossibility motivated the posterior-to-posterior comparison espoused in this paper, and subse-
quently generalized by Bassily et al. [1]. In contrast to the prior-to-posterior approach, the framework
discussed in this paper does generalize to arbitrary distributions on the data (and, hence, to arbitrary side
information). Bassily et al. [1] suggest the term “inference-based” for definitions which explicitly discuss
the posterior distributions constructed by Bayesian adversaries.
Hypothesis Testing. Wasserman and Zhou [18] relate differential privacy to the type I and II errors of a
hypothesis test. Specifically, fix an ǫ-differentially private mechanism A, an i.i.d. distribution on the data x,
an index i, and disjoint sets S and T of possible values for the i-th entry xi of x. Wasserman and Zhou [18]
show that any hypothesis test (given A(x), and full knowledge of the input product distribution on x and the
differentially private mechanism A) for the hypothesis H1 : xi ∈ S versus the alternative H1 : xi ∈ T must
satisfy
1− β ≤ eǫα , (4)
where α is the significance level (maximum type-I error) and 1−β is the power (maximum type-II error) of
the test. In other words, the test rejects the hypothesis with approximately the same probability regardless
of whether the hypothesis is true. This perspective was extended to (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy by Hall et al.
[13].
This is a reasonable requirement. Note, however, that it holds only for product distributions, which limits
its applicability. More importantly, a very similar statement can be proven for the statistical difference-based
definition discussed in Remark 1. Specifically, one can show that
1− β ≤ α+ ǫSD . (5)
when the mechanism satisfies the definition of Remark 1. Equation (4) has the same natural language
interpretation as equation (5), namely, “the test rejects the hypothesis with approximately the same proba-
bility regardless of whether the hypothesis is true”. However, as mentioned in the Remark 1, the statistical
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difference-based definition allows mechanisms that publish detailed personal data in the clear. This makes
the meaning of a hypothesis-testing-based definition hard to evaluate intuitively. We hope the definitions
provided here are easier to interpret.
3 Proofs of Main Results
We begin this section by defining (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishability and stating a few of its basic properties (Sec-
tion 3.1, with proofs in Appendix A). Section 3.2 gives the proof of our main result for ǫ-differential privacy.
In Section 3.3 we state and prove the Conditioning Lemma, the main tool which allows us to prove our re-
sults about (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy (Section 3.4).
3.1 (ǫ, δ)-Indistinguishability and its Basic Properties
The relaxed notions of (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy implicitly uses a two-parameter distance measure on proba-
bility distributions (or random variables) which we call (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishability. In this section, we develop
a few basic properties of this measure. These properties listed in Lemma 3.3 will play an important role in
establishing the proofs of Theorems 2.2 and 2.4
Definition 3.1 ((ǫ, δ)-indistinguishability). Two random variables X,Y taking values in a set D are (ǫ, δ)-
indistinguishable if for all sets S ⊆ D,
Pr[X ∈ S] ≤ eǫ Pr[Y ∈ S] + δ and Pr[Y ∈ S] ≤ eǫ Pr[X ∈ S] + δ.
We will also be using a variant of (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishability, which we call point-wise (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishability.
Lemma 3.3 (Parts 1 and 2) shows that (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishability and point-wise (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishability
are almost equivalent.
Definition 3.2 (Point-wise (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishability). Two random variables X and Y are point-wise (ǫ, δ)-
indistinguishable if with probability at least 1− δ over a drawn from either X or Y , we have:
e−ǫ Pr[Y = a] ≤ Pr[X = a] ≤ eǫ Pr[Y = a].
Lemma 3.3. Indistinguishability satisfies the following properties:
1. If X,Y are point-wise (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishable then they are (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishable.
2. If X,Y are (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishable then they are point-wise
(
ǫ , δ · 21−e−ǫ
)
-indistinguishable.
3. Let X be a random variable on D. Suppose that for every a ∈ D, A(a) and A′(a) are (ǫ, δ)-
indistinguishable (for some randomized algorithms A and A′). Then the pairs (X,A(X)) and
(X,A′(X)) are (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishable.
4. Let X be a random variable. Suppose with probability at least 1 − δ1 over a ∼ X, A(a) and A′(a)
are (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishable (for some randomized algorithms A and A′). Then the pairs (X, A(X))
and (X, A′(X)) are (ǫ, δ + δ1)-indistinguishable.
5. IfX,Y are (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishable (orX,Y are point-wise (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishable), then SD (X,Y ) ≤
ǫ¯+ δ, where ǫ¯ = eǫ − 1.
The lemma is proved in Appendix A.
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3.2 Case of ǫ-Differential Privacy: Proof of Theorem 2.2
Theorem 2.2 (restated) (Dwork-McSherry). ǫ/2-differential privacy implies ǫ¯-semantic privacy, where
ǫ¯ = eǫ − 1. ǫ/2-semantic privacy implies 3ǫ-differential privacy as long as ǫ ≤ 0.45.
Proof. Consider any database x ∈ Dn. LetA be an ǫ/2-differentially private algorithm. Consider any belief
distribution b. Let the posterior distributions b¯0[x|t] and b¯i[x|t] for some fixed i and t be as defined in (1)
and (2). ǫ/2-differential privacy implies that for every database z ∈ Dn
e−ǫ/2 Pr[A(z−i) = t] ≤ Pr[A(z) = t] ≤ eǫ/2 Pr[A(z−i) = t].
These inequalities imply that the ratio of b¯0[x|t] and b¯i[x|t] (defined in (1) and (2)) is within e±ǫ. Since these
inequalities holds for every x, we get:
∀x ∈ Dn, e−ǫb¯i[x|t] ≤ b¯0[x|t] ≤ eǫb¯i[x|t].
This implies that the random variables (distributions) b¯0[·|t] and b¯i[·|t] are point-wise (ǫ, 0)-indistinguishable.
Applying Lemma 3.3 (Part 5) with δ = 0, gives SD (b¯0[·|t], b¯i[·|t]) ≤ ǫ¯. Repeating the above arguments for
every belief distribution, for every i, and for every t, shows that A is ǫ¯-semantically private.
To see that ǫ-semantic privacy implies 3ǫ-differential privacy, consider a belief distribution b which is
uniform over two databases x, y which are at Hamming distance of one. Let i be the position in which x and
y differ. Fix a transcript t. The distribution b¯i[·|t] will be uniform over x and y since they induce the same
distribution on transcripts in Game i. This means that b¯0[·|t] will assign probabilities 1/2 ± ǫ to each of the
two databases (by Definition 2.1). Working through Bayes’ rule shows that (note that b[x] = b[y])
Pr[A(x) = t]
Pr[A(y) = t] =
b¯0[x|t]
b¯0[y|t]
≤
1
2 + ǫ
1
2 − ǫ
≤ e3ǫ(since ǫ ≤ 0.45). (6)
Since the bound in (6) holds for every t, A(x) and A(y) are point-wise (3ǫ, 0)-indistinguishable. Using
Lemma 3.3 (Part 1), implies that A(x) and A(y) are (3ǫ, 0)-indistinguishable. Since this relationship holds
for every pair of neighboring databases x and y, means that A is 3ǫ-differentially private.
3.3 A Useful Tool: The Conditioning Lemma
We will use the following lemma to establish connections between (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy and (ǫ, δ)-
semantic privacy. Let B|A=a denote the conditional distribution of B given that A = a for jointly distributed
random variables A and B.
Lemma 3.4 (Conditioning Lemma). Suppose the pair of random variables (A,B) is (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishable
from the pair (A′, B′). Then, for ǫˆ = 3ǫ and for every δˆ > 0, the following holds: with probability at least
1 − δ′′ over t ∼ B (or, alternatively, over t ∼ B′), the random variables A|B=t and A′|B′=t are (ǫˆ, δˆ)-
indistinguishable, where δ′′ = 2δ
δˆ
+ 2δ
1−e−ǫ
.
We can satisfy the conditions of the preceding lemma by setting δˆ = δ′′ = O(
√
δ) for any constant ǫ.
However, the proof of our main theorem will use a slightly different setting (with δ′′ smaller than δˆ).
Proof. Let (A,B) and (A′, B′) take values in the set D ×E. In the remainder of the proof, we will use the
notation A|t for A|B=t and A′|t for A′|B′=t. Define,
Bad1 =
{
t ∈ E : ∃St ⊂ D such that Pr[A|t ∈ St] > eǫˆ Pr[A′|t ∈ St] + δˆ
}
Bad2 =
{
t ∈ E : ∃St ⊂ D such that Pr[A′|t ∈ St] > eǫˆ Pr[A|t ∈ St] + δˆ
}
.
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To prove the lemma, it suffices to show that the probabilities Pr[B ∈ Bad1 ∪ Bad2] and Pr[B′ ∈ Bad1 ∪
Bad2] are each at most δ′′. To do so, we first consider the set
Bad0 =
{
t ∈ E : Pr[B = t] < e−2ǫ Pr[B′ = t] or Pr[B = t] > e2ǫ Pr[B′ = t]} .
We will separately bound the probabilities of Bad0, Bad′1 = Bad1 \Bad0 and Bad′2 = Bad2 \Bad0.
To bound the mass of Bad0, note that B and B′ are (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishable (since they are functions of
(A,B) and (A′, B′))3. Since (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishability implies point-wise (2ǫ, 2δ1−e−ǫ )-indistinguishability
(Lemma 3.3, Part 2), we have
Pr[B ∈ Bad0] ≤ 2δ
1− e−ǫ .
We now turn to Bad′1 = Bad1 \Bad0. For each t ∈ Bad′1, let St be any set that witnesses t’s membership
in Bad1 (that is, for which Pr[A|t ∈ St] exceeds eǫˆ Pr[A′|t ∈ St] + δˆ). Consider the critical set
T1 =
⋃
t∈Bad′
1
(St × {t}) .
Intuitively, this set will have large mass if Bad′1 does. Specifically, by the definition of St, we get a lower
bound on the probability of T1:
Pr[(A,B) ∈ T1] =
∑
t∈Bad′
1
Pr[A|t ∈ St] Pr[B = t]
>
∑
t∈Bad′
1
(eǫˆ Pr[A′|t ∈ St] + δˆ) Pr[B = t]
=

 ∑
t∈Bad′
1
eǫˆ Pr[A′|t ∈ St] Pr[B = t]

+ δˆ Pr[B ∈ Bad′1].
Because Bad′1 does not contain points in Bad0, we know that Pr[B = t] ≥ e−2e Pr[B′ = t]. Substituting
this into the bound above and using the fact that ǫˆ = 3ǫ and Pr[A′|t ∈ St] = Pr[A′ ∈ St |B′ = t], we get
Pr[(A,B) ∈ T1] ≥
∑
t∈Bad′
1
eǫˆ Pr[A′ ∈ St |B′ = t]e−2ǫ Pr[B′ = t] + δˆ Pr[B ∈ Bad′1]
= eǫ Pr[(A′, B′) ∈ T1] + δˆ Pr[B ∈ Bad′1].
By (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishability, Pr[(A,B) ∈ T1] ≤ eǫ Pr[(A′, B′) ∈ T1] + δ. Combining the upper and lower
bounds on the probability that (A,B) ∈ T1, we have δˆ Pr[B ∈ Bad′1] ≤ δ, which implies that
Pr[B ∈ Bad′1] ≤ δ/δˆ .
By a similar argument, one gets that Pr[B ∈ Bad′2] ≤ δ/δˆ. Finally,
Pr[B ∈ Bad1 ∪Bad2] ≤ Pr[B ∈ Bad0] + Pr[B ∈ Bad′1] + Pr[B ∈ Bad′2]
=
2δ
1− e−ǫ +
δ
δˆ
+
δ
δˆ
=
2δ
1− e−ǫ +
2δ
δˆ
= δ′′.
By symmetry, we also have Pr[B′ ∈ Bad1 ∪Bad2] ≤ 2δ1−e−ǫ + 2δδˆ . Therefore, with probability at least
1− δ′′, A|t and A′|t are (ǫˆ, δˆ)-indistinguishable, as claimed.
3Note: Even if we started with the stronger assumption that the pairs (A,B) and (A′, B′) are point-wise indistinguishable, we
would still have to make a nontrivial argument to bound Bad0, since point-wise indistinguishability is not, in general, closed under
postprocessing.
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3.4 The General Case: Proof of Theorem 2.4
Theorem 2.4 (restated).
(1) If ǫ, δ > 0 and δ < (1 − e−ǫ)2/n, then (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy implies (ǫ′, δ′)-semantic privacy on
databases of size n with ǫ′ = e3ǫ − 1 + 2√nδ and δ′ = 4√nδ.
(2) If ǫ, δ > 0 and ǫ ≤ 0.45, then (ǫ, δ)-semantic privacy implies (3ǫ, 2δ)-differential privacy.
Proof. (1) Let A be an (ǫ, δ)-differentially private algorithm. Let b be any belief distribution and let x ∼ b.
Let Ai(x) = A(x−i), i.e., Ai on input x constructs x−i and then applies A on it. From Lemma 3.3 (Part 3),
we know that (x,A(x)) and (x,Ai(x)) are (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishable for every index i = 1, . . . , n.
Apply Lemma 3.4 withA(X) = A(x), A′(X) = Ai(x), ǫˆ = 3ǫ, and δˆ =
√
nδ. We get that with proba-
bility at least 1−δ′′ over t ∼ A(x), the random variables x|A(x)=t and x|Ai(x)=t are (ǫˆ, δˆ)-indistinguishable,
where δ′′ ≤ 2δ/δˆ + 2δ/(1 − e−ǫ) ≤ 4
√
δ/n. Note that 1 − e−ǫ > δˆ =
√
nδ (a condition assumed in the
theorem).
Let δ′ = nδ′′; note that δ′ ≤ 4√nδ. Taking a union bound over all n choices for the index i, we get that
with probability at least 1 − δ′ over the choice of t ∼ A(x), all n variables x|Ai(x)=t (for different i’s) are
(ǫˆ, δˆ)-indistinguishable from x|A(x)=t.
To complete the proof of (1), recall that (ǫˆ, δˆ)-indistinguishability implies statistical distance at most
e3ǫˆ − 1 + δˆ = ǫ′.
(2) To see that (ǫ, δ)-semantic privacy implies (3ǫ, 2δ)-differential privacy, consider a belief distribution
b which is uniform over two databases x, y which are at Hamming distance of one. The proof idea is same
as in Theorem 2.2. Let i be the position in which x and y differ. Let A be an algorithm that satisfies
(ǫ, δ)-semantic privacy.
In Game i, x and y induce the same distribution on transcripts, so the distribution b¯i[·|t] will be uniform
over x and y (for all transcripts t). We now turn to Game 0 (the real world). Let E denote the set of
transcripts t such that b¯0[·|t] assigns probabilities in 1/2 ± ǫ to each of the two databases x and y. Let A¯
denote the (random) output of A when run on a database sampled from distribution b. The semantic privacy
of A implies E occurs with probability at least 1 − δ over t ∼ A¯. Working through Bayes’ rule as in
Theorem 2.2 shows that
e−3ǫ Pr[A(y) = t] ≤ Pr[A(x) = t] ≤ e3ǫ Pr[A(y) = t]
for all t ∈ E. (This last step uses the assumption that ǫ ≤ 0.45). Moreover, since A¯ is an equal mixture
of A(x) and A(y), the event E must occur with probability at least 1 − 2δ under both t ∼ A(x) and
t ∼ A(y) Hence, A(x) and A(y) are (3ǫ, 2δ)-indistinguishable. Since this relationship holds for every pair
of neighboring databases x and y, means that A is (3ǫ, 2δ)-differentially private.
4 Further Discussion
Theorem 2.4 states that the relaxations of differential privacy in some previous work still provide meaningful
guarantees in the face of arbitrary side information. This is not the case for all possible relaxations, even
very natural ones, as noted in Remark 1.
9
Calibrating Noise to a High-Probability Bound Local Sensitivity. In a different vein, the techniques
used to prove Theorem 2.4 can also be used to analyze schemes that do not provide privacy for all pairs of
neighboring databases x and y, but rather only for most such pairs (remember that neighboring databases are
the ones that differ in one entry). Specifically, it is sufficient that those databases where the indistinguisha-
bility condition fails occur only with small probability.
We first define a weakening of Definition 2.3 so that it only holds for specific belief distributions.
Definition 4.1 ((ǫ, δ)-local semantic privacy). A randomized algorithm is (ǫ, δ)-local semantically private
for a belief distribution b on Dn if with probability at least 1− δ over t ∼ A(x) (t drawn from A(x)), where
the database x is drawn according to b, and for all i = 1, . . . , n:
SD
(
b¯0[·|t] , b¯i[·|t]
) ≤ ǫ.
Theorem 4.2. Let A be a randomized algorithm. Let
E = {x : ∀ neighbors y of x,A(x) and A(y) are (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishable}.
ThenA satisfies (ǫ′, δ′)-local semantic privacy for any belief distribution b such that b[E ] = Prx∼b[x ∈ E ] ≥
1− δ1 with ǫ′ = e3ǫ − 1 +
√
nδ2 and δ′ ≤ 4
√
nδ2 as long as ǫ >
√
nδ2, where δ2 = δ + δ1.
Proof. The proof is similar to Theorem 2.4 (1). Let b be a belief distribution with b[E ] ≥ 1 − δ1 and let
x ∼ b. From Lemma 3.3 (Part 4), we know that (x,A(x)) and (x,Ai(x)) are (ǫ, δ + δ1)-indistinguishable,
where Ai(x) = A(x−i). The remaining proof follows exactly as in Theorem 2.4 (1).
We now discuss a simple consequence of the above theorem to the technique of adding noise according
to local sensitivity of a function.
Definition 4.3 (Local Sensitivity, [17]). For a function f : Dn → R, and x ∈ Dn, the local sensitivity of f
at x is:
LSf (x) = max
y : dH (x,y)=1
|f(x)− f(y)|.
LetLap(λ) denote the Laplacian distribution. This distribution has density function h(y) ∝ exp(−|y|/λ),
mean 0, and standard deviation λ. Using the Laplacian noise addition procedure of [10, 17], along with The-
orem 4.2 we get4,
Corollary 4.4. Let E = {x : LSf (x) ≤ s}. LetA(x) = f(x)+ Lap
(
s
ǫ
)
. Let b be a belief distribution such
that b[E ] = Prx∼b[x ∈ E ] ≥ 1− δ1. Then A satisfies (ǫ′, δ′)-local semantic privacy for belief distribution b
with ǫ′ = e3ǫ − 1 +√nδ1 and δ′ ≤ 4
√
nδ1 as long as ǫ >
√
nδ1.
Proof. Let x ∼ b. If x ∈ E , then it follows from [10, 17], that A(x) and A(x−i) are (ǫ, 0)-indistinguishable
for every index i = 1, . . . , n. We can apply Theorem 4.2 to complete the proof.
The approach discussed here was generalized significantly by Bassily et al. [1]; we refer to their work
for a detailed discussion.
4Similar corollaries could be derived for other differential privacy mechanisms like those that add Gaussian noise instead of
Laplacian noise.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 3.3
Proof of Part 1. Let Bad be the set of bad values of a, that is
Bad = {a : Pr[X = a] < e−ǫ Pr[Y = a] or Pr[X = a] > eǫ Pr[Y = a]}.
By definition, Pr[X ∈ Bad] ≤ δ. Now consider any set S of outcomes.
Pr[X ∈ S] ≤ Pr[X ∈ S \Bad] + Pr[X ∈ Bad].
The first term is at most eǫ Pr[Y ∈ S \ Bad] ≤ eǫ Pr[Y ∈ S]. Hence, Pr[X ∈ S] ≤ eǫ Pr[Y ∈ S] + δ, as
required. The case of Pr[Y ∈ S] is symmetric. Therefore, X and Y are (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishable.
Proof of Part 2. Let S = {a : Pr[X = a] > e2ǫ Pr[Y = a]}. Then
Pr[X ∈ S] > e2ǫ Pr[Y ∈ S] .
By (ǫ, δ) indistringuishability, we have δ ≥ Pr[X ∈ S] − eǫ Pr[Y ∈ S] > (e2ǫ − eǫ) Pr[Y ∈ S]. Equiva-
lently,
Pr[Y ∈ S] < δ
e2ǫ − eǫ =
δ
e2ǫ(1− e−ǫ) . (7)
Now consider the set S′ = {a : Pr[X = a] < e−2ǫ Pr[Y = a]}. A symmetric argument to the one above
shows that Pr[X ∈ S′] < δ/(e2ǫ − eǫ). Again using indistinguishability, we get
Pr[Y ∈ S′] ≤ eǫ Pr[X ∈ S′] + δ < eǫ δ
e2ǫ − eǫ + δ =
δ
1− e−ǫ . (8)
The bound of (8) is always larger than that of (7), so we have Pr[Y ∈ S ∪S′] ≤ δ · 2eǫeǫ−1 . We can get the
same bound on Pr[X ∈ S ∪ S′] by symmetry. Therefore, with probability at least 1− δ · 2eǫeǫ−1 for a drawn
from the distribution of either X or Y we have: e−2ǫ Pr[Y = a] ≤ Pr[X = a] ≤ e2ǫ Pr[Y = a].
Proof of Part 3. Let (X,A(X)) and (X,A′(X)) be random variables on D × E. Let S be an arbitrary
subset of D × E and, for every a ∈ D, define Sa = {b ∈ E : (a, b) ∈ S}.
Pr[(X,A(X)) ∈ S] ≤
∑
a∈D
Pr[A(X) ∈ Sa |X = a] Pr[X = a]
≤
∑
a∈D
(eǫ Pr[A′(X) ∈ Sa |X = a] + δ) Pr[X = a]
≤ δ + eǫ Pr[(X,A′(X)) ∈ S].
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By symmetry, we also have Pr[(X,A′(X)) ∈ S] < δ+eǫ Pr[(X,A(X)) ∈ S]. Since the above inequalities
hold for every selection of S, implies that (X,A(X)) and (X,A′(X)) are (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishable.
Proof of Part 4. Let (X,A(X)) and (X,A′(X)) be random variables on D × E. Let T ⊂ D be the set of
a’s for which A(a) ≤ eǫA′(a). Now, let S be an arbitrary subset of D × E and, for every a ∈ D, define
Sa = {b ∈ E : (a, b) ∈ S}.
Pr[(X,A(X)) ∈ S] =
∑
a/∈T
Pr[A(X) ∈ Sa |X = a] Pr[X = a] +
∑
a∈T
Pr[A(X) ∈ Sa |X = a] Pr[X = a]
≤
∑
a/∈T
Pr[X = a] +
∑
a∈T
Pr[A(X) ∈ Sa |X = a] Pr[X = a]
= Pr[X /∈ T ] +
∑
a∈T
Pr[A(X) ∈ Sa |X = a] Pr[X = a]
≤ δ1 +
∑
a∈T
(eǫ Pr[A′(X) ∈ Sa |X = a] + δ) Pr[X = a]
≤ δ + δ1 + eǫ Pr[(X,A′(X)) ∈ S].
By symmetry, we also have Pr[(X,A′(X)) ∈ S] < δ+δ1+eǫ Pr[(X,A(X)) ∈ S]. Since the above inequal-
ities hold for every selection of S, implies that (X,A(X)) and (X,A′(X)) are (ǫ, δ+δ1)-indistinguishable.
Proof of Part 5. Let X and Y be random variables on D. By definition SD (X,Y ) = maxS⊂D |Pr[X ∈
S]− Pr[Y ∈ S]|. For any set S ⊂ D,
2|Pr[X ∈ S]− Pr[Y ∈ S]|
= |Pr[X ∈ S]− Pr[Y ∈ S]|+ |Pr[X /∈ S]− Pr[Y /∈ S]|
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
c∈S
(Pr[X = c]− Pr[Y = c])
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
c/∈S
(Pr[X = c]− Pr[Y = c])
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
c∈S
|Pr[X = c]− Pr[Y = c]|+
∑
c/∈S
|Pr[X = c]− Pr[Y = c]|
=
∑
c∈D
|Pr[X = c]− Pr[Y = c]|
≤
∑
c∈D
(eǫ Pr[Y = c] + δ − Pr[Y = c]) +
∑
c∈D
(eǫ Pr[X = c] + δ − Pr[X = c])
= 2δ + (eǫ − 1)
∑
c∈D
Pr[Y = c] + (eǫ − 1)
∑
c∈D
Pr[X = c]
≤ 2(eǫ − 1) + 2δ = 2ǫ¯+ 2δ.
This implies that |Pr[X ∈ S]− Pr[Y ∈ S]| ≤ ǫ¯+ δ. Since the above inequality holds for every S ⊂ D, it
immediately follows that the statistical difference between X and Y is at most ǫ¯+ δ.
B Another View of Semantic Privacy
In this section, we discuss another possible definition of (ǫ, δ)-semantic privacy. Even though this definition
seems to be the more desirable one, it also seems hard to achieve.
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Definition A.1 (reality-oblivious (ǫ, δ)-semantic privacy). A randomized algorithm is reality-oblivious (ǫ, δ)-
semantically private if for all belief distributions b onDn, for all databases x ∈ Dn, with probability at least
1− δ over transcripts t drawn from A(x), and for all i = 1, . . . , n:
SD
(
b¯0[·|t] , b¯i[·|t]
) ≤ ǫ.
We prove that if the adversary has arbitrary beliefs, then (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy doesn’t provide any
reasonable reality-oblivious (ǫ′, δ′)-semantic privacy guarantee.
Theorem A.2. (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy does not imply reality-oblivious (ǫ′, δ′)-semantic privacy for any
reasonable values of ǫ′ and δ′.
Proof. This counterexample is due to Dwork and McSherry: suppose that the belief distribution is uniform
over {(0n), (1, 0n−1)}, but that real database is (1n). Let the database x = (x1, . . . , xn). Say we want to
reveal f(x) =
∑
i xi. Adding Gaussian noise with variance σ2 = log
(
1
δ
)
/ǫ2 satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy (refer [10, 17] for details). However, with overwhelming probability the output will be close to
n, and this will in turn induce a very non-uniform distribution over {(0n), (1, 0n−1)} since (1, 0n−1) is
exponentially (in n) more likely to generate a value near n than (0n). More precisely, due to the Gaussian
noise added,
Pr[A(x) = n | x = (0n)]
Pr[A(x) = n | x = (1, 0n−1)] =
exp
(
−n2
2σ
)
exp
(
−(n−1)2
2σ
) = exp
(−2n+ 1
2σ
)
.
Therefore, given that the output is close to n, the posterior distribution of the adversary would be exponen-
tially more biased toward (1, 0n−1) than (0n). Hence, it is exponentially far away from the prior distribution
which was uniform. On the other hand, on x−1, no update will occur and the posterior distribution will
remain uniform over {(0n), (1, 0n−1)} (same as the prior). Since the posterior distributions in these two sit-
uations are exponentially far apart (one exponentially far from uniform, other uniform), it shows that (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy does not imply any reasonable guarantee on reality-oblivious semantic privacy.
The counterexample of Theorem B implies that adversaries whose belief distribution is very different
from the real database may observe a large change in their posterior distributions. We do not consider this a
‘violation of “privacy”, since the issue lies in the incorrect beliefs, not the mechanism per se.
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